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TACTFUL INATTENTION:
ERVING GOFFMAN, PRIVACY IN THE
DIGITAL AGE, AND THE VIRTUE OF
AVERTING ONE’S EYES
ELIZABETH DE ARMOND†
Finders, keepers
Losers, weepers1
Mind your own beeswax2
INTRODUCTION
According to the sociologist Erving Goffman, we each need a
backstage in which we “can relax; [we] can drop [our] front, forgo
speaking [our] lines and step out of character.”3 That is, we need
a place to free ourselves from the “façade of performance” that
being in front of others can impose.4 Shielding one’s backstage
from outsiders has become much harder. Developments in
information technology have made accessible all sorts of
“backstage” areas, including our social activities with family and
friends, our financial choices and commitments, and our
purchasing preferences, among heaps of others. With all the
information swirling around us, we may have to innovate our
approaches to protecting privacy.
Rather than feasting on any and all data we can find,
perhaps, we could occasionally avert our eyes from information
that’s not our own. “Tactful inattention,”5 coined by Goffman,
†
Professor, Legal Research and Writing and Director of Legal Writing, ChicagoKent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology.
1
Old English adage.
2
American saying, attributed by some to colonial America. See STEVEN D.
PRICE, ENDANGERED PHRASES: INTRIGUING IDIOMS DANGEROUSLY CLOSE TO
EXTINCTION 144 (2011).
3
ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 70 (1959)
[hereinafter GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION].
4
Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy as Trust: Sharing Personal Information in a
Networked World, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 559, 570 (2015) (citing GOFFMAN, THE
PRESENTATION, supra note 3, at 112).
5
Goffman also sometimes referred to it as “civil inattention.” See, e.g., ERVING
GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES: NOTES ON THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF
GATHERINGS 84 (1963). Subsequently, Professor Anita Allen described a similar
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describes the appropriate response of an outsider who makes an
“inopportune intrusion[]” into a region where insiders have
“patently been witnessed in activity that is quite incompatible
with the impression that they are, for wider social reasons, in a
position to maintain to the intruder.”6 An outsider should adopt
this tactful inattention response when that outsider gained
access to the insider’s area notwithstanding the insider’s
intentions to keep the region, the “backstage,” curtained off, at
least from that particular intruder.7 The insider and the outsider
share the burden—the insider must take steps to create a
bounded backstage, and, correspondingly, the outsider must
observe those boundaries.
With the phrase “tactful inattention,” Goffman captured the
socially salutary response to the undue access to someone’s
backstage; it is a sort of averting one’s eyes, as one might do, for
instance, in a locker room or a gym. Information may be
available to you, but you should not scrutinize it or use it to your
own advantage.
However, in contrast to the tactful inattention paradigm,
many laws intended to protect privacy protect only “secret”
information, and largely prohibit the disclosure, rather than the
use of the information. Under this paradigm, which Professor
Daniel Solove labels the “secrecy paradigm,”8 to prevent others
from using information they have acquired about you for
evaluating you, you must keep the information entirely under
wraps. This can be thought of as the “finders-keepers” paradigm.
Privacy laws that adopt the secrecy paradigm assume that the
way to protect individual privacy is for the individual to entomb
the information. However, the secrecy paradigm is at odds with
advances in information technology that have crippled our ability
to keep information secret. We dribble data crumbs everywhere
we go, leaving the possibility that the only backstage area

concept of “virtuous inattention.” See Anita Allen, Privacy Law: Positive Theory and
Normative Practice, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 241, 243–44 (2013).
6
GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION, supra note 3, at 132.
7
See id. at 132–35.
8
See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY
IN THE INFORMATION AGE 42–44 (2004); Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation:
Public Records, Privacy, and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1140–41
(2002) (“[T]he ‘secrecy paradigm[]’ understands privacy as depending upon whether
information is secret or non-secret. The secrecy paradigm fails to account for the
realities of the Information Age, where information is rarely completely
confidential.”).
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remaining to any of us is the interior of our own heads.9 The ease
with which these crumbs can be mapped, linked, copied, and
shared by electronic means has exponentially increased the
accessibility of personal information, and correspondingly
crippled the efficacy of the secrecy paradigm.
As barriers to accessibility of information have dissolved, the
secrecy paradigm leads to a game of cat and mouse, with the
winner taking the position that discovery yields all spoils. To
dislodge an item of information is to destroy any privacy
entitlement. This is a “gotcha” paradigm for privacy, whereby
revealing any information, even unintentionally, risks making it
available for all to see—and use.
The entire burden for
protecting privacy rests on the target.
Given our human, sociological need for a backstage, though,
this secrecy paradigm rewards those who can use technology to
shine a spotlight into the darkest niche of every closet, while
enfeebling individual privacy and the maintenance of backstage
areas that might allow us to avoid “discrediting,”10 an unexpected
and unsought change in status.11 To that point, humans may
well be motivated to discredit. Goffman emphasizes that by
nature, humans are eager to “pounce on chinks in [our] symbolic
armour in order to discredit [our] pretensions.”12
This Article suggests that we would benefit if we would
protect privacy by sometimes requiring tactful inattention by
potential users rather than total secrecy by the target. That is,
some legal privacy protections should stop emphasizing secrecy
and instead emphasize the appropriate uses of personally
identifiable and often sensitive information by gelling tactful
inattention into legal standards. Culturally, such an expansion
may be difficult, as we tend to a “finders-keepers” attitude
towards data. However, given technology’s ability to dissolve
routine barriers, if we require others to leave some information

9
As neuroscience develops, who knows how long it will be before we will read
brain waves as easily as The New York Times? See Joëlle Anne Moreno, The Future
of Neuroimaged Lie Detection and the Law, 42 AKRON L. REV. 717, 717–22 (2009)
(describing some recent developments in cognitive neuroscience research).
10
GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION, supra note 3, at 7. Goffman emphasized the
role of “tact,” explaining that “few impressions could survive if those who received
the impression did not exert tact in their reception of it.” Id. at 7.
11
Erving Goffman, Embarrassment and Social Organization, 62 AM. J. OF SOC.
264, 268 (1956).
12
GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION, supra note 3, at 38.
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out of some equations, we may be able to retain the personal
flourishing that privacy promotes, without unduly impairing the
information needs of others.
Not only has the tactful inattention paradigm already
existed in some traditional areas of law, but it also has occurred
in some new laws in specific areas of recent concern. Part I
discusses the benefits to flourishing that privacy provides, both
individually and within relationships. Part II describes the
development of the tactful inattention paradigm in various areas
of law. Part III suggests two specific areas that might benefit
from a paradigm of tactful inattention: the use of certain
behavioral information by employers to screen applicants and
employees, and the use of similar information by political
campaigns and vendors to target behavioral advertising and for
vendors, micro-target pricing. Finally, Part IV describes the
benefits of a tactful inattention approach to privacy in the digital
age.
I.
A.

THE HUMAN NEED FOR A BACKSTAGE TO FLOURISH

Philosophers on Privacy—Goffman and Others

To
thrive
and
flourish—to
achieve
Aristotle’s
13
“eudaemonia” —we need a “backstage” on which to try on
various roles, and test and assess our reactions to ourselves,
others, and events. Furthermore, we need a sheltered area not
only for our own thoughts, but for some of our relations with
others. These relationships benefit not only ourselves, but also
society as a whole. To mark the boundaries of these backstage
areas, we use social rules and conventions that protect dignity.14

13
See Eudemonic, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (defining
“eudemonic” as being “[c]onducive to happiness”); see also K. Craig Welkener,
Possible but Not Easy: Living the Virtues and Defending the Guilty, 26 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1083, 1093 (2013) (“Though commentators explain that eudemonia is
impossible to translate adequately into English, its central meaning can be
expressed as the good life, a state of wholeness, or flourishing.”); ARISTOTLE,
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 307 (Martin Ostwald trans., Prentice Hall, Inc., 1999) (c. 384
B.C.E.) (emphasis in original) (defining “eudaimon” to mean “[H]APPY, usually in the
sense of a happiness attained by man through his own efforts”).
14
Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the
Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 962 (1989); see also Edward J. Bloustein,
Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 962, 971 (1964) (describing Warren and Brandeis’s “principle of ‘inviolate
personality’ to posit the individual’s independence, dignity and integrity”).
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The Backstage for Our Own Thoughts

To have a backstage promotes personhood15 and autonomy.16
To protect personhood is to allow ourselves and others to develop
and maintain the “inviolate personality” of Warren and Brandeis
fame.17
When one is completely deprived of a backstage, such as in a
prison or an asylum, we suffer what Erving Goffman describes as
an effect of “contaminative exposure.”18 Robert Gerstein has
emphasized that such “contaminative exposure” hampers
autonomy: “It is clear that anyone who intrudes uninvited on the
intimacy of another person interferes with his autonomy in a
very serious way.”19
Thus, to preserve autonomy, we need some sort of partition
that shields us from exposure. The scholars Georg Simmel,
Erving Goffman, Robert Post, and Alan Westin all speak of a
buffer around individuals that protects their privacy.20 For
Simmel, the buffer is one of “reciprocal reserve and
indifference,”21 which places an “ideal sphere [that] lies around
every human being”;22 for Goffman, it is an “information

15
Paul Freund defined “personhood” to mean “those attributes of an individual
which are irreducible in his selfhood.” Paul A. Freund, Address, 52 A.L.I. PROC. 574
(1975); see also Jessica L. Roberts, Protecting Privacy to Prevent Discrimination, 56
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2097, 2106 (2015) (“Protecting privacy allows us to more freely
construct our identities and negotiate our social interactions.”); Daniel J. Solove,
Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1116 (2002).
16
See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 15, at 2105–06 (“Insofar as privacy is construed
as a matter of control, its primary underlying norm is autonomy.”); Robert S.
Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, 89 ETHICS 76, 78 (1978).
17
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 205 (1890). The phrase has been criticized as being too imprecise. See
David Rosen & Aaron Santesso, Inviolate Personality and the Literary Roots of the
Right to Privacy, 23 LAW & LITERATURE 1, 6 (2011); see also Solove, supra note 15, at
1118 (criticizing the theory of privacy as personhood for failing to adequately define
“personhood”).
18
ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL
PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES 23 (1961) [hereinafter GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS]. Goffman
describes the process of admission to such an institution, emphasizing the
accumulation of losses of privacy, from having one’s body and possessions physically
searched, to sleeping in a communal space, using doorless toilets, and suffering
ceaseless surveillance. Id. at 16–25.
19
Gerstein, supra note 16, at 76, 78, 80 (1978) (citing GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS,
supra note 18).
20
See infra notes 21–24 and accompanying text.
21
GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 418 (KURT H. WOLFF ED.
& TRANS., 1951).
22
Id. at 321.
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preserve[]”;23 for Post, the buffer is a “sacred precinct[]”;24 for
Westin, such a buffer is a reserve, a state of privacy that exists as
“a psychological barrier against unwanted intrusion.”25
This buffer protects our dignity and our personhood.26
Jeffrey Reiman argues that “privacy is necessary to the creation
of selves out of human beings, since a self is at least in part a
human being who regards his existence—his thoughts, his body,
his actions—as his own.”27 Similarly, Stefano Scoglio emphasizes
the value of “interiority,” “the ability to be self-reflecting and
critical without reflecting whims imposed by mass-market
culture.”28
When others breach the rules that protect these buffers, they
“damage a person by discrediting his identity and injuring his
personality.”29 To uphold these rules through, for example, legal
devices like privacy torts, “simultaneously uphold[s] social norms
and redress[es] ‘injury to personality.’ ”30

23

ERVING GOFFMAN, The Territories of the Self, in RELATIONS IN PUBLIC:
MICROSTUDIES OF THE PUBLIC ORDER 38–39 (1971) [hereinafter GOFFMAN, The
Territories of the Self] (identifying “[t]he set of facts about [one]self to which an
individual expects to control access while in the presence of others”).
24
Post, supra note 14, at 960 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485 (1965)).
25
ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 32 (1967). Reserve is one of the four
states of privacy that Alan Westin identifies, along with solitude, anonymity, and
intimacy. Id. at 31; see also Alan F. Westin, Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues
and Proposals for the 1970’s Part I—The Current Impact of Surveillance on Privacy,
66 COLUM. L. REV. 1003, 1022 (1966) (describing reserve as the “ ‘mental distance’ to
protect the personality,” that “takes place in every sort of relationship under the
rules of social etiquette”).
26
Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
26, 37 (1976) (“[P]rivacy is fundamentally connected to personhood.”); see also Julie
E. Cohen, What Privacy Is for, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1906, 1911 (2013) (“Privacy
is shorthand for breathing room to engage in the processes of boundary management
that enable and constitute self-development,” and “is one of the resources that
situated subjects require to flourish.”).
27
Reiman, supra note 26, at 39 (emphasis in original).
28
Daniel E. Newman, European Union and United States Personal Information
Privacy and Human Rights Philosophy—Is There a Match?, 22 TEMP. INT’L & COMP.
L.J. 307, 315 (2008) (citing STEFANO SCOGLIO, TRANSFORMING PRIVACY: A
TRANSPARENT PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHTS 2 (1998)).
29
Post, supra note 14, at 963. Post states that “[b]y following these rules,
individuals not only confirm the social order in which they live, but they also
establish and affirm ‘ritual’ and ‘sacred’ aspects of their own and others’ identities.”
Id. at 962.
30
Id. at 963.
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The Backstage for Our Relationships

While we need privacy to preserve the solitude of our
relationship with ourselves, privacy is also important to our
relationships with others; Professor Charles Fried argues that
without privacy, relations of “respect, love, friendship and trust”
become impossible.31 He, too, rests these relations on the concept
of personality.32 Like Goffman, Fried invokes the concept of
respect for others.33 He rejects the privacy-as-secrecy paradigm,
characterizing privacy as “the control we have over information
about ourselves.”34 Fried argues that privacy permits us to
“modulate” friendships,35 and to learn to “express our humanity”
by learning to accord trust.36
We can find examples of judicial recognition of the need for
privacy to protect and nourish such intimate relationships. For
instance, in Hamberger v. Eastman, a licentious landlord
stealthily installed a secret recording device in the bedroom of
the home he had rented to the plaintiffs, a married couple.37 The
landlord wired the device to transmit into his own home.38 When
the plaintiffs uncovered the recorder, they sued the landlord for
invasion of privacy.
The landlord argued that the New
Hampshire Supreme Court should dismiss the couple’s invasion
of privacy claim because they did not allege that anyone actually
listened to or overheard any sounds from the bedroom.39
However, the court rejected that argument, concluding that the
installation of the eavesdropping device was an “injury to
personality.”40 The court compared the conduct to that of a
“Peeping Tom,” and quoted Pound’s Jurisprudence to describe

31

Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477 (1968).
Id. at 478.
33
Id. at 479. Fried describes respect as a correlative to morality, something we
are obligated to demonstrate to one another simply by virtue of being persons. Id.
34
Id. at 482 (emphasis in original). Furthermore, he sees privacy as a feature of
liberty. Id. at 483.
35
Id. at 485.
36
Id. at 486. He acknowledges, though, that our privacy can be only “relative
and qualified.” Id.
37
206 A.2d 239, 239–40 (N.H. 1964).
38
Id.
39
Id. at 242.
40
Id.
32
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the injury as one that “may produce suffering more acute than
that produced by a mere bodily injury”41 within the married
plaintiffs’ intimate relationship.
Professor Post linked the Hamberger court’s respect for the
couple’s intruded-upon space to the language of the United
States Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut: the marital
space was a “ ‘sacred precinct[]’ . . . into which it is plainly highly
offensive to intrude.”42 This sacred precinct did not lie solely
within the boundaries of either the husband or the wife’s
personality, but rather within the space those personalities
shared.43
A backstage for our relationships allows us to have room to
develop what James Rachels describes as different patterns of
behavior for different relationships.44 Privacy allows us to
control “who has access to us,” and without that control “we
cannot control the patterns of behavior we need to adopt . . . or
the kinds of relations with other people that we will have.”45
Accordingly, by protecting privacy, we create space for
intimate relationships to flourish, contributing to their
participants’ eudemonia.
3.

Preservation of Backstages Through Rules of Civility

So if our personhoods and our relationships with others need
backstage areas to thrive, how do we define those areas and then
protect them? The secrecy paradigm would have us erect
impermeable domes over them, but doing so may choke our
flourishing, both of ourselves and of our chosen relationships. In
that case, we might well have to go “off the grid” completely to
avoid inadvertently dribbling data that others could use to
discredit and harm us, both individually and as members of
relationships.
In contrast, under the tactful inattention

41
Id. (quoting III POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 58 (1959)). Post critiques this aspect
of the Hamberger opinion because it places “an intense and narrow focus on the
actual mental suffering of specific individuals.” Post, supra note 14, at 960.
42
Id. at 960 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)).
43
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86.
44
James Rachels, Why Privacy Is Important, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323, 327
(1975). Rachels states these different patterns of behavior “are an important part of
what makes the different relationships what they are.” Id.; see also Roberts, supra
note 15, at 2107 (footnotes omitted) (“[P]rivacy is essential to our relationships.
What we reveal to an employer will differ from what we reveal to a family member,
which will likewise differ from what we reveal to a lover.”).
45
Rachels, supra note 44, at 331.
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paradigm, we may justifiably expect that others will avert their
eyes from information in which they do not have a sufficient
interest.46
Law is an “essential element” of privacy,47 and accordingly
necessary to fully obtain the benefits of personal flourishing and
fulfilling relationships, along with the societal advantages that
flow from both. As explained above,48 a number of privacy
scholars have described a buffer around individuals, and around
those engaged in intimate relationships with one another, that
helps them flourish and that they are entitled to keep shielded.
How can law map and preserve such buffers, given the
omniscient availability of data and the avaricious appetites of
others for it?
In terms of the buffer’s dimensions, many privacy scholars
have referred to some set of rules, or conventions, that should set
the boundaries of the areas to which others should give tactful
inattention.
In the past, this buffer, these “information
preserves,”49 often had a geographical aspect. For instance, to
illustrate territories of reserve, Professor Post relies on the public
disclosure case of Huskey v. N.B.C., in which a prisoner who was
filmed while in the prison’s exercise cage successfully stated a
claim for invasion of privacy against the television network
N.B.C. for that filming.50 In this case, the prisoner’s “information
preserve” was the “expectation . . . that the only ones able to see
him would be persons ‘to whom he might be exposed as a
necessary result of his incarceration.’ ”51 The court rejected the
television network’s argument that the fact that the plaintiff
could have been seen by others within the prison meant that he
could not be “secluded” for purposes of the tort.52 The prisoner

46

For Goffman, tactful inattention, which he also called “civil inattention,”
“gives to another enough visual notice to demonstrate that one appreciates that the
other is present . . . while at the next moment withdrawing one’s attention . . . so as
to express that he does not constitute a target of special curiosity or design.” ERVING
GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES: NOTES ON THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF
GATHERINGS 84 (1963).
47
Fried, supra note 31, at 493.
48
See supra text accompanying notes 14–47.
49
GOFFMAN, The Territories of the Self, supra note 23, at 38–39.
50
632 F. Supp. 1282, 1285 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
51
Id. at 1285.
52
Id. at 1287. Judge Shadur also noted that “one paradigm case of the tort is
the Peeping Tom.” Id. at 1288.
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had been in an area generally outside of the gaze of visitors, one
in which he could feel “justifiably secluded from the outside
world.”53
As Post construes it, the court allowed the “actual customs
and usages of the exercise cage,” and not the “ ‘objective’ facts of
visibility, secrecy, anonymity, and solitude,” to define the
boundaries of the territory in which the prisoner could “legally
claim the right to undisturbed ‘seclusion.’ ”54 Construing the
boundaries this way helped to redistribute the power to discredit,
protecting dignity and autonomy.
In a similar vein, Fried identifies “convention” as defining
private areas.55 To preserve these conventions is to justifiably
demand that others give them tactful inattention. Meanwhile,
the Hamberger decision referred to “rules of decency recognized
by the reasonable man.”56 As mentioned above, Professor Post,
for his part, describes these as rules of civility, which can help
define the boundaries of tactful inattention.57
Jeffrey Reiman also identifies space-framing rules, though
not as rules of civility but rather as a “social practice.”58 He
refers obliquely to the boundaries of civility rules by describing
privacy in relation to the act of “refraining,” which is another
way of saying “inattending.” According to Reiman, privacy is a
“complex of behaviors that stretches from refraining from asking
questions about what is none of one’s business to refraining from
looking into open windows one passes on the street, from
refraining from entering a locked door without knocking.”59
“Privacy is a social ritual by means of which an individual’s
moral title to his existence is conferred.”60 As examples of these
rules embodied in law, Post identifies the paired privacy torts of
intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of private facts as
“safeguard[ing] rules of civility.”61 These torts thereby protect
individuals from “the dignitary harm [that] plaintiffs suffer as a

53

Id.
See Post, supra note 14, at 972.
55
Fried, supra note 31, at 487.
56
Post, supra note 14, at 963.
57
Id. at 984. (citing ERVING GOFFMAN, The Nature of Deference and Demeanor,
in INTERACTION RITUAL: ESSAYS ON FACE-TO-FACE BEHAVIOR 47 (1967)).
58
Reiman, supra note 26, at 38.
59
Id. at 38–39.
60
Id. at 39.
61
Post, supra note 14, at 959.
54
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result of having been treated disrespectfully,”62 much the same
way that Fried discusses the right of people to be treated with
respect.63
Privacy rules support personality development by
encouraging what Professor Anita Allen calls “virtuous
inattention,” promoting a “moral virtue” of “[a] balance of
inattention to others’ personal lives and attention to one’s
own . . . .”64
B. The Secrecy Paradigm’s Impairment of the Backstage
The secrecy paradigm restricts information by focusing on
nondisclosure, seeking to maintain privacy by “hiding”
information.65 Sometimes the burden is on the person to whom
the information pertains. Other times, the burden to keep
information secret is not on the target—the person to whom the
information pertains—but on a third party who possesses the
information. A classic secrecy paradigm presents itself in the
Fourth Amendment’s third-party doctrine, which provides that a
party usually loses all Fourth Amendment expectations of
privacy in any information disclosed to a third party. To disclose
to one is to disclose to all, and most especially, to the
government.66
The Supreme Court created the third-party doctrine in
United States v. Miller, where it held that the defendant, a bank
depositor, had no protectable interest under the Fourth
Amendment in his bank records, subpoenaed by the Treasury
Department.67
The Court reasoned that the subpoenaed
documents “[were] not [his] ‘private papers’ ” because they
“contain[ed] only information voluntarily conveyed to the

62
Id. at 967. Post distinguishes this sort of harm from the “contingent
psychological injuries that plaintiffs may suffer as a result of the violation of civility
rules.” Id. at 966.
63
Fried, supra note 31, at 478.
64
Allen, supra note 5, at 244 (“Inattention to others’ personal lives may also be
a qualitative benefit to civil society.”).
65
See supra Part I and accompanying footnotes.
66
See Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General
Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1036 (2010). But see United States v. Warshak,
631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating that “the mere ability of a third-party
intermediary to access the contents of a communication cannot be sufficient to
extinguish a reasonable expectation of privacy” and holding that an email recipient
could retain a constitutionally-recognized expectation of privacy in email).
67
425 U.S. 435, 436–37 (1976).

294

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:283

banks.”68
Accordingly, “[t]he depositor takes the risk, in
revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be
conveyed by that person to the Government.”69
The Court developed the doctrine more fully in Smith v.
Maryland,70 in which the petitioner was a robber caught after he
harassed his victim by calling her from his home phone.71 Using
the victim’s description of the robber and his car, the police
investigating the calls were able to trace the robber’s license
plate number, and then his home address.72 Without a warrant,
the police had the telephone company install a pen register to
record the numbers dialed from the thief’s home, which recorded
a call to the victim.73 On the basis of that evidence, the police
sought a warrant to search the thief’s home and found evidence
that led to his arrest and conviction.74 The thief challenged the
denial of his motion to suppress the evidence from the
warrantless pen register, arguing that he had an expectation of
privacy in the numbers that he dialed.75 However, the Court
ruled that any such expectation was unreasonable because he
knew that he was disclosing the dialed numbers to the telephone
company, who needed the numbers to connect his call and to bill
him.76
In other words, he “voluntarily” turned over that
information to a third party—the telephone company—and
thereby lost any expectation of privacy in them.77
The third-party doctrine has received harsh criticism for its
conception of privacy, one “that views Fourth Amendment
privacy as constituting a form of total secrecy.”78 Its application
68

Id. at 441–42.
Id. at 443.
70
442 U.S. 735, 735 (1979).
71
Id. at 737.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 737–38.
76
Id. at 742.
77
Id. at 744.
78
Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1136 (2002). Professor Henderson states that:
The third party doctrine is objectionable even if limited as recommended.
First, it treats privacy as an indivisible commodity—once information is
given to any one party for any one purpose, it is treated as if it were given
to every person for any possible purpose as far as the Fourth Amendment is
concerned.
Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational
Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507, 546 (2005). Another
69
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to modern digital data raises specific concerns, as the Supreme
Court recognized in 2018 in Carpenter v. United States.79 There,
five justices trimmed the reach of Smith and Miller, concluding
that the law enforcement’s capture of cell phones’ cell-site
location information from telecommunications companies is a
search that generally requires a warrant under the Fourth
Amendment.80 The Court emphasized the sensitivity of the data:
“the time-stamped data provides an intimate window into a
person’s life, revealing not only his particular movements,” but
also “ ‘the privacies of life.’ ”81
While the third-party doctrine would have concluded that
the cell-phone user voluntarily released the information to their
providers and thereby lost their privacy interests, the Carpenter
majority firmly rejected that application, reasoning that the
doctrine assumes “that an individual has a reduced expectation
of privacy in information knowingly shared with another.”82 But
even where one shares information, the doctrine must consider
“the nature of the particular documents sought.”83 Cell-site
location data can provide “a detailed chronicle of a person’s
physical presence compiled every day, every moment, over
several years.” In contrast, Smith’s call logs and Miller’s checks
conveyed limited information.84 Furthermore, the doctrine’s
other rationale, voluntary exposure of the data, did not logically
extend to data like cell phone location information because “in no

scholar states that “[t]he theory in Smith rests on a fallacy,” and compares the
government’s “snooping” through such third-party information as “smack[ing] of
Orwell’s Big Brother, protection from which is the essence of the [F]ourth
[A]mendment.” Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for Fourth
Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 600 (1989); see also Marissa A. Lalli,
Note, Spicy Little Conversations: Technology in the Workplace and a Call for a New
Cross-Doctrinal Jurisprudence, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243, 261 (2011) (identifying
“significant backlash from scholars who find it outdated”).
79
138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
80
Id. at 2221.
81
Id. at 2217 (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494–95 (2014)).
82
Id. at 2219.
83
Id.
84
Id. The Court characterized the location data as “present[ing] even greater
privacy concerns than [that of] GPS monitoring of a vehicle.” Id. at 2218. It noted
that “[w]hile individuals regularly leave their vehicles, they compulsively carry cell
phones with them all the time. A cell phone faithfully follows its owner beyond
public thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor’s offices, political
headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales.” Id.
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meaningful sense does the user voluntarily ‘assume[] the risk’ of
turning over a comprehensive dossier of his physical
movements.”85
Nonetheless, the reach of Carpenter is narrow for the
moment,86 and the secrecy paradigm continues to animate many
laws outside of the Fourth Amendment realm. For instance, the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act’s87 Privacy
Rule88 prohibits regulated parties from disclosing individually
identifiable health information, and is broadly defined to include
just about any health-related information traceable to a
particular individual.89 It represents the secrecy paradigm by
requiring identifiable data to be entombed, rather than by
requiring others to avert their eyes from the identifying
markers.90
In addition, business associates who receive
personally identifiable information are subject to contractual
restrictions that bar them from re-disclosing the information
under many circumstances.91

85

Id. at 2220 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979)).
Id. at 2220 (“Our decision today is a narrow one. We do not express a view on
matters not before us . . . .”).
87
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996).
88
The Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.101–161.105, 164.101–164.106, 164.500–
164.534 (2013).
89
42 U.S.C. § 1320d(6) (2012). The full definition is as follows:
The term “individually identifiable health information” means any
information, including demographic information collected from an
individual, that-(A) is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, employer,
or health care clearinghouse; and
(B) relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or
condition of an individual, the provision of health care to an individual, or
the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an
individual, and-(i) identifies the individual; or
(ii) with respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe that the
information can be used to identify the individual.
90
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM SERVS., O.C.R., Guidance Regarding Methods
for De-identification of Protected Health Information in Accordance with the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule (Nov. 26, 2012),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentiti
es/De-identification/hhs_deid_guidance.pdf.
91
See Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 164.314 (2013); see also id. § 164.504(e)(2).
86
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Similarly, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
employs the secrecy paradigm in places92 to protect genetic
information by requiring entities subject to the act to keep such
information as a “confidential medical record,” and to withhold
disclosure of it, unless a specific exception permits disclosure.93
These demands place the full burden of privacy on the
information’s keeper.
The Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”)94 also adopts the
secrecy paradigm by prohibiting video tape service providers95
from
“knowingly
disclos[ing] . . . personally
identifiable
information concerning any consumer.”96 Two circuit courts of
appeals have ruled that the VPPA does not authorize a suit
against a person who receives—as opposed to a service provider
who discloses—personally identifiable information about a
consumer.97 Rather, it is the video tape service provider who
must keep mum about the information once the information is
received by someone else.
The secrecy paradigm’s Achilles’ heel is that in the age of
digital technology and increasing surveillance, keeping
information secret is formidably difficult, and one dribble of a
digital crumb can bring a slew of consequences, including the loss
of the right to harness the laws based on the secrecy paradigm to
keep the information from being used by others. Technology has
made it much easier to grab and keep data that was once
functionally invisible.98 Companies have greedily sucked up
92

The GINA also employs the tactful inattention paradigm. See infra text
accompanying notes 135–38.
93
42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-5 (2012) (confidentiality of genetic information);
29 C.F.R. § 1635.9(a)(1), (b) (2008).
94
18 U.S.C.A. § 2710 (West 2014).
95
Id. § 2710(a)(4).
96
Id. § 2710(b). Certain exceptions are available, including for disclosures
“incident to the ordinary course of business.” Id. § 2710(b)(2)(E).
97
In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 281 (3d Cir. 2016);
Daniel v. Cantrell, 375 F.3d 377, 382–84 (6th Cir. 2004).
98
In The Right to Privacy, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis referred
indirectly to the effect of technology in explaining why the tort of breach of
confidentiality was inadequate to protect privacy:
The narrower doctrine [of breach of contract] may have satisfied the
demands of society at a time when the abuse to be guarded against could
rarely have arisen without violating a contract or special confidence; but
now that modern devices afford abundant opportunities for the
perpetration of such wrongs without any participation by the injured party,
the protection granted by the law must be placed upon a broader
foundation.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 17, at 210–11.
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information about consumers through their transactions, and
then when they fail to sufficiently to protect the data they have
amassed, it becomes a rich target for hackers.99 Accordingly,
Professors Woodrow and Hartzog describe the secrecy paradigm
as “unworkable online” in part because “it simply does not reflect
societal or individual notions of privacy.”100
We could simply require people to avoid technology should
they want to continue to keep private information now made
accessible through technology. For instance, under old, snailmail technology, the contents of a sealed letter are kept cloaked
from prying eyes.
However, email technology, which has
replaced snail mail for many uses, reveals to those with access
everything sent using the system. So, that argument goes, keep
your information private by not using modern technology.
However, letting technology vitiate long-standing privacy
principles penalizes people who enjoy the benefits of
technological advancement and who use them to fully participate
in society.101
One scholar, Benjamin Zhu, has criticized “[t]he secrecy
paradigm’s focus on the private-public dichotomy [as] hinder[ing]
the application of the intrusion tort to the data collection stage of
99
See, e.g., Chronology of Data Breaches, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach (last visited Sept. 16, 2018) (identifying
and describing data breaches from 2005 to the present); Paul Ohm, Branding
Privacy, 97 MINN. L. REV. 907, 908 (2013).
100
Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101
CAL. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2013). The authors describe a concept of obscurity founded in
part by the court’s reasoning in Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restuarant Group, in which a
restaurant employee had created a closed group on a social network site that
permitted visitors only with an invitation and a password. No. 06–5754 (FSH), 2008
WL 6085437, at *1 (D.N.J. July 25, 2008). One of the users showed the site to a
restaurant manager, which led to other managers accessing it. Id. The site’s creators
sued the managers’ employer, alleging, among other claims, invasion of privacy. Id.
at *2. In denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on that claim, the
court stated, “Plaintiffs created an invitation-only internet discussion space [in
which] they had an expectation that only invited users would be able to read the
discussion.” Id. at *6. Professors Hartzog and Stutzman argue that “[b]y giving such
weight to password protections, Pietrylo laid the foundation for a concrete concept of
obscurity.” Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 100, at 27. Other cases focusing on
password protection, say the authors, “suggest[] that courts are willing to depart
from the rule that individuals have no expectation of privacy in information posted
online.” Id. at 28.
101
See Andrew J. DeFilippis, Note, Securing Informationships: Recognizing a
Right to Privity in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 115 YALE L.J. 1086, 1091–92
(2006) (noting the effects on privacy of our transformation to a digital society, and
stating that “to ask a person to refrain from using e-mail for fear of its recordability
is to ask him to live a premodern life.”).
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dataveillance.”102 Professor Patricia Sánchez Abril similarly
criticized the secrecy paradigm’s application to modern data
practices, noting that “[i]n cyberspace, the complete secrecy
requirement of privacy torts is difficult, if not impossible, to
satisfy.
Total secrecy is difficult offline; this difficulty is
magnified online.”103
A different approach to this accessibility advance is to adapt
the secrecy paradigm to the new technology by pretending that
the access has not arisen. For instance, although the attorneyclient privilege is generally waived when an attorney
communicates otherwise confidential information to a client in
front of a third party,104 several courts have ruled that using
email to communicate confidential information will not void the
privilege–even though the technology has the capability of
revealing the information to any number of potential watchers
along the way.105 This is something of a “secrecy fiction,” but one

102

Benjamin Zhu, A Traditional Tort for a Modern Threat: Applying Intrusion
upon Seclusion to Dataveillance Observations, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2381, 2397 (2014).
Professor Zhu cites two Illinois cases that illustrate this shortcoming of the secrecy
paradigm. In Busse v. Motorola, Inc., a class of mobile phone customers alleged that
their service providers had transferred their customer data to a private research
firm, including names, addresses, and dates of birth, for its own study; the court
held that no intrusion had occurred because the information was not private. 813
N.E.2d 1013, 1017 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). Similarly, in Dwyer v. American Express Co.,
charge card holders challenged the defendants’ practice of renting to third parties
lists compiling their spending information; the court held that no unauthorized
intrusion occurred, because “[b]y using the American Express card, a cardholder is
voluntarily, and necessarily, giving information to defendants that, if analyzed, will
reveal a cardholder’s spending habits and shopping preferences.” 652 N.E.2d 1351,
1354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
103
Patricia Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 25 (2007). As an example, Professor Abril cites Wilson v.
Harvey, 842 N.E.2d 83 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). In that case, a college student sued
three fellow students who had put up flyers around campus with the plaintiff’s
name, email, and phone number that depicted him as a homosexual. Id. at 86. The
appellate court affirmed a directed verdict on the student’s public disclosure of
private facts claim, reasoning that none of the published information was private
because “it was published in various forms obtainable by university students and
faculty.” Id. at 91.
104
See Lluberes v. Uncommon Prods., LLC, 663 F.3d 6, 24 (1st Cir. 2011); see
generally, 2 Paul R. Rice, ATTORNEY–CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE U.S. § 9:79 (2017).
105
See, e.g., In re Asia Glob. Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 251 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2005) (concluding that communicating with one’s attorney via email does not,
without more, waive the protection of the attorney-client privilege); City of Reno v.
Reno Police Protective Ass’n, 59 P.3d 1212, 1218 (Nev. 2002). A third party’s
presence will generally not nullify the privilege where the third party is a necessary
participant to the conversation. See, e.g., PSE Consulting, Inc. v. Frank Mercede &
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF TACTFUL INATTENTION
We exercise tactful inattention in our social interactions. As
Jeffrey Rosen has pointed out, “it[ i]s considered rude to stare at
strangers whom you encounter in public.”106 For instance, to use
a real-territory (rather than a cyber-territory) example, an
American bathroom stall affords privacy but not through ironclad
barriers to prying eyes—they usually have gaps at the top and
bottom edges and between the door and its frame.107
Nonetheless, we justifiably expect that notwithstanding these
points of access, others will avert their eyes from our
vulnerabilities when we are within that space. One scholar of
privacy and design invokes Goffman’s “civil inattention” to
describe it as a “device of scrupulously observed avoidance
behavior . . . [that] demands that we avoid observing other
people’s behavior . . . .”108
Tactful inattention may be a concept recognized more readily
by some other cultures. For instance, in Germany it is possible
that one may appear fully nude in a public park, yet maintain a
culturally-accepted belief that one is entitled to not be stared at,
that is, to be entitled to have others avert their eyes from the
display of nudity.109 One author characterizes this practice as
“respectful ‘civil inattention.’ ”110
Sons, Inc., 838 A.2d 135, 167 n.28 (Conn. 2004); People v. Osorio, 75 N.Y.2d 80, 84,
549 N.E.2d 1183, 550 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1989).
106
JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN
AMERICA 16 (2000) (citing GOFFMAN, supra note 5, at 84–85, 116).
107
However, one author has emphasized the difference in architectural design of
American public bathrooms, and their fostering of policing functions, compared with
those in Europe, where complete “floor-to-ceiling enclosures” are more common.
ALEXANDER KIRA, THE BATHROOM 204–05 (Viking Press 1976).
108
Id. at 204. We do this by “try[ing] to ignore the presence of other problems
while at the same time acknowledging them by being careful not to intrude on their
privacy.” Id. He describes the example of diners in Soviet restaurants, “which have
the disconcerting habit, for us, of filling every empty seat with unrelated diners.” Id.
Accordingly, an unrelated pair of diners seated at a table for four “can preserve their
privacy only . . . by mutually practicing civil inattention or avoidance behavior . . . ”
Id. at 204. He points out that “[c]ivil inattention” as a term describes our
“instinctive[] realiz[ation] that the delicate behavioral devices that guarantee our
privacy and that of our neighbors is a mutually dependent exercise.” Id.
109
See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1201 (2004) (“As any German there will tell you, it is a
matter of ordinary politeness that nude people have a right not to be stared at.
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Traditional Examples of Tactful Inattention in Law

The expectation of tactful inattention arises not only in
social settings; it also exists in legal expectations. While the
secrecy paradigm is common,111 the concept of mandating tactful
inattention already appears in some laws. Sometimes the law
directs itself to tactful inattention from the start, prohibiting an
initial capture of others’ information, and sometimes it directs
itself to post-capture behavior, prohibiting the use of the
information.
1.

Tactful Inattention by Prohibiting the Capture of Available
Information

“Peeping Tom” statutes represent an early attempt to
encourage the averting of eyes.112 They do not restrict criminal
liability to those situations where the target has taken all
possible steps to limit access to view, but rather put some onus
on the peeper to confine his gaze.113 For instance, Louisiana
defines a “Peeping Tom” as “one who peeps through windows or
doors . . . situated on or about the premises of another . . . for the
purpose of spying upon or invading the privacy of persons spied
upon.”114 Curiously, Peeping Tom statutes tend not to specifically
define the verb “peep.” The Oxford English Dictionary defines it
as “[t]o look through a narrow aperture . . . to look quickly or
furtively from a vantage point; to steal a glance.”115 The fact that

Taking off all your clothes, even in a public park, does not constitute a surrender of
your privacy.”).
110
CARLIN A. BARTON, ROMAN HONOR: THE FIRE IN THE BONES 204 n.18 (2001).
111
See supra text accompanying notes 8–11.
112
See, e.g., H. Morley Swingle & Kevin M. Zoellner, Criminalizing Invasion of
Privacy: Taking a Big Stick to Peeping Toms, 52 J. MO. B. 345, 345 (1996). The term
“Peeping Tom” derives from the legend of Lady Godiva, whose husband, the Earl of
Mercia, promised to repeal ruinous taxes that he’d levied on the citizens of Coventry
if she dared to ride through the town’s market on horseback nude. See RONALD
AQUILLA CLARKE & PATRICK A.E. DAY, LADY GODIVA: IMAGES OF A LEGEND IN ART &
SOCIETY 8 (1982). The legend was made famous by the poem of Alfred Lord
Tennyson, where he described “one low churl . . . /Peep’d—but his eyes before they
had their will,/Were shrivell’d into darkness in his head,/And dropt before him.”
Alfred, Lord Tennyson, Godiva (1842).
113
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16–11–61 (2016); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:284 (2016);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1171 (2008).
114
LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:284.
115
Peep, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
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visual access can be won from outside the premises does not
mean that the regarder is entitled to the view. Rather, the
regarder must shift the gaze elsewhere.116
Anti-recording laws, such as the Electronic Communication
Privacy Act’s Wiretap Act, can also present as tactful inattention
laws; they prohibit a person from interacting in a particular way
with the information—the intercepting of it.117 The listener
remains free to use the content of the information in indirect
discourse, along the lines of “he said ‘____.’ ” However, the
listener may not target the speech as the object of his or her
recording device.118
2.

Prohibiting the Use of Captured Information

The tactful inattention paradigm can also present as the
prohibition not of the capture or possession of sensitive
information, but the use of it for a particular purpose. For
example, the crime of blackmail criminalizes the blackmailer’s
use of embarrassing information to serve a particular purpose—
to manipulate the target. In this context, the tactful inattention
paradigm combats directly the abuse of access to and possession
of sensitive information, and the imbalance in power that arises
out of blackmail.119 Prohibiting blackmail, Solove says, “prevents

116
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16–11–61 (“Peeping Tom”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:284 (“Peeping Tom; penalties”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14–202 (2017) (“peep[ing]
secretly into any room occupied by another person”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16–17–470
(2018) (“[e]avesdropping, peeping, voyeurism”); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2–130 (2018)
(“[p]eeping or spying into a dwelling or enclosure”).
117
Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2012). Not only does the Wiretap Act
prohibit the intercepting of specified communications, it forbids one from using data
that one knows has been recorded in violation of the Act. Also, note that the statute
forbids the use of data you know has been illegally recorded. Id. § 2511(c). This
provision has faced constitutional challenges. Compare Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S.
514 (2001) (individual who had played no role in illegally intercepting a
communication could not be liable for broadcasting it where it concerned matters of
public concern) with Boehner v. McDermott, 484 F.3d 573 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (First
Amendment did not preclude enforcement of provision against a Congressman who
obtained tape of a telephone conversation where he was a member of the
Congressional Ethics Committee, which subjected him to independent nondisclosure
rules).
118
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
119
See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 543
(2006) [hereinafter Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy] (“With blackmail, the harm is not
in the actual disclosure of the information, but the control exercised by the one who
makes the threat over the data subject.”).
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people from taking advantage of us with our personal
information.”120 It also requires the blackmailer to “inattend” the
sensitive information—though perhaps not exactly “tactfully.”121
In terms of regulating personal identity, false impersonation
laws, which are precursors to modern state identity theft
prohibitions,122 also exemplify a sort of tactful inattention model.
That is, the statutes generally do not criminalize the acquisition
of the data,123 or its disclosure, but its specific use for identified
purposes, such as to obtain something of value.124
Tactful inattention is also a feature of evidence law, where a
jury might be instructed that a specific item of information may
be considered for one purpose, but may not be considered for
another.125
In the civil context, a typical trade secrets law may forbid
one from using a trade secret known to a person if that person
knows, or should know, that the trade secret was acquired
improperly.126 As Professor Sharon Sandeen writes, the doctrine
of “relative secrecy” allows for information to continue to benefit
from the trade secret doctrine even when known by several
individuals or entities.127 The fact that someone outside the

120

Id. at 544.
See supra Introduction.
122
See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16–30 ( West 2018) (defining “identity
theft” and “aggravated identity theft”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.80 (MCKINNEY 2008)
(defining “identity theft in the first degree”). But see 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/16–31(a) (defining the crime of “transmission of personal identifying information,”
which applies when “information is photographed or otherwise captured, recorded,
distributed, disseminated, or transmitted” without the consent of the person about
whom the information pertains). This would exemplify the “secrecy” paradigm
rather than the “tactful inattention” paradigm.
123
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 529 (West 2018) (originally enacted in 1872);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.02 (West 2018) (originally enacted in 1868); MASS. GEN. LAWS
CH. 266, § 71 (West 2018).
124
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 529; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.02; MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 71.
125
FED. R. EVID. 105 provides that “[i]f the court admits evidence that is
admissible against a party or for a purpose—but not against another party or for
another purpose—the court, on timely request, must restrict the evidence to its
proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.” Some scholars have expressed
skepticism about the efficacy of curative or limiting instructions. See, e.g., Dan
Simon, More Problems with Criminal Trials: The Limited Effectiveness of Legal
Mechanisms, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., 167, 177–180 (2012).
126
See, e.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1065/2(b)(1) (West 2018) (defining
misappropriation).
127
Sharon K. Sandeen, Relative Privacy: What Privacy Advocates Can Learn
from Trade Secret Law, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 667, 696 (2006). She describes the
121
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“backstage area” now possesses the trade secret does not destroy
the protection. Somewhat similarly, the Fourth Amendment’s
exclusionary rule prohibits the use of information acquired
through an unconstitutional search, at least in some
circumstances.128
The need for tactful inattention often occurs as a result of a
secondary use of information, which in Professor Solove’s
taxonomy is “the use of data for purposes unrelated to the
purposes for which the data was originally collected without the
data subject’s consent.”129 Professor Solove identifies the harm
from secondary use as a “dignitary harm,” arguing that
“[s]econdary uses thwart people’s expectations about how the
data they give out will be used.”130 Furthermore, he notes that
data that is “removed from the original context in which it was
collected . . . can more readily be misunderstood.”131 The Fair
Information Practices set out by the U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare incorporate this limit of secondary use by
providing that “[t]here must be a way for an individual to prevent
information about him obtained for one purpose from being used
or made available for other purposes without his consent.”132 The
federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 implements this
limitation on secondary use by making it “unlawful for any
person knowingly to obtain or disclose personal information, from
a motor vehicle record, for any use not permitted [by the Act].”133
This type of required tactful inattention has also been called “use
regulation.”134

law as “recogniz[ing] legal rights in the originator . . . depend[ing] upon the
circumstances of disclosure.” Id. at 697.
128
See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
129
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 129–33 (2008).
130
Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 119, at 521.
131
Id.
132
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 41 (1973).
133
Driver’s Privacy Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2722 (2012).
134
Chris Jay Hoofnagle, The Potemkinism of Privacy Pragmatism: Civil
Liberties Are Too Important To Be Left to the Technologists, SLATE (Sept. 2, 2014,
8:36 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/09/data_use_
regulation_the_libertarian_push_behind_a_new_take_on_privacy.html.
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C. Modern Adoptions of Tactful Inattention in Law
This part discusses four areas of modern legislation that
incorporate the tactful inattention paradigm.
1.

The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act

The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (the
“GINA”) is an example of the tactful inattention and secrecy
paradigms working together within a single law.135 The GINA
requires covered entities to keep genetic information confidential,
subject to certain limited exceptions, a secrecy paradigm
feature.136 But it also acknowledges that sometimes such data
may be revealed, and steps forward to limit the use of such
information by prohibiting employers from discriminating
against employees because of genetic information.137
The
legislators who passed the GINA seemed to recognize that some
prohibited uses of genetic information may be rational, even
otherwise beneficial to the user, but that nonetheless, other
values—including privacy—outweigh that justification.138
2.

The Fair Credit Reporting Act

The Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) also uses features of
both the tactful inattention paradigm and the secrecy paradigm,
showing that they are not entirely exclusive, but can complement
each other. The FCRA prohibits consumer reporting agencies
from reporting some adverse information that Congress
designated as obsolete.139 Thus, in general, an agency may not
insert into consumer reports certain adverse items of information

135

Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-11 (2012).
Id. § 2000ff-5.
137
Id. § 2000ff-1(a) (prohibiting discrimination by employers); Id. § 2000ff-2(a)
(prohibiting discrimination by employment agencies); Id. § 2000ff-3(a) (prohibiting
discrimination by labor organizations); 29 C.F.R. § 1635.9(a) (2016) (requiring
confidentiality, prohibiting disclosure).
138
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a) (defining certain prohibited employment practices
based on genetic information). Solove notes that there’s a purpose in prohibiting the
penalization of “people for things they cannot control.” Solove, A Taxonomy of
Privacy, supra note 119, at 533.
139
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a) (2012).
136
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it has acquired that are more than seven years old.140 However,
the FCRA reinstates obsolete information’s eligibility for certain
large-scale transactions and employment.141
The FCRA’s obsolescence provisions illustrate the tactful
inattention paradigm by prohibiting consumer reporting agencies
from publicizing information that they may have acquired about
a consumer.142 The provisions also have features of the secrecy
paradigm in that the agencies must keep such information secret
while simultaneously averting their eyes from it.
3.

Pre-Existing Employee “Lifestyle” Laws

Many states prevent employers from freely using
information about an employee’s personal activities that they
might come across (or scour for) against such employees;
sometimes employers are forbidden from even keeping a record of
them.
For example, the state of Michigan forbids employers from
“gather[ing] or keep[ing] a record of an employee’s associations,
political activities, publications, or communication of
nonemployment activities.”143 However, the statute does permit
employers to monitor such activities that occur on the employers’
premises or during working hours and that “interfere with the
performance of the employee’s duties or duties of other
employees.”144 Similarly, New York protects a broad category of
employee “recreational activities,” from employer discrimination,
including “sports, games, hobbies, exercise, reading and the

140
Id. § 1681c(a)(5). Criminal convictions are exempt from the prohibition. Id.
§ 1681c(a)(5). And bankruptcies don’t become stale until after ten years. Id. The Fair
Credit Reporting Act provides specific designations for the time from which the
identified period runs for bankruptcies, civil suits, civil judgments, records of arrest,
paid tax liens, and accounts placed for collection that help determine when the
seven-year period starts. Id. § 1681c(a)(1)–(4), (c). These obsolescence provisions
have withstood a First Amendment challenge. King v. Gen. Info. Servs., 903 F. Supp.
2d 303, 306, 313 (E.D. Pa. 2012). The obsolescence provisions pertain only to
negative information; the Act does not restrict the reporting of old positive
information. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1681c.
141
15 U.S.C. § 1681c(b).
142
Id. § 1681c(a).
143
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.508(1) (West 2018).
144
Id.
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viewing of television, movies and similar material.”145 Other
states with similar laws include Montana,146 North Dakota,147 and
Colorado.148
These laws express the tactful inattention paradigm by
acknowledging implicitly that personal information not
sufficiently impinging on that employee’s work should not play a
role in the employers’ assessments. Employers must avert their
eyes from such information, regardless of the efforts or lack
thereof―the employee has made to hide the information. In this
way, these lifestyle laws are a model for similar laws.
4.

Employer Use of Credit Reports and Criminal Records

Recently, states have begun to regulate the use by employers
of their applicants’ credit reports and even their criminal records.
This background information is often easily available from
consumer reporting agencies, and certainly the federal FCRA
permits such investigation by employers.149 However, some
states have recognized that even though certain information may
be accessible, it nonetheless should not always play a role in
145
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(1)(b) (MCKINNEY 2018). New York permits employers
to allow themselves to be influenced by such activities if they occur during working
hours or on the employer’s premises, and also where the activities “create[] a
material conflict of interest related to the employer’s . . . business interest.” Id.
§ 201-d(3)(a). Other exceptions also exist. Id. § 201-d(3)(b)-(e).
146
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(5) (West 2017) (generally prohibiting
employers from firing employees without “good cause,” and specifically identifying
“[t]he legal use of a lawful product by an individual off the employer’s premises
during nonworking hours” as not being a good cause). As is typical of such laws, an
employer may act upon that information in certain narrow circumstances where the
employer’s interests are affected. Id. § 39-2-313.
147
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.4-03 (West 2017) (designating as a
“discriminatory practice” the making of employment decisions because of an
employee’s “participation in lawful activity off the employer’s premises during
nonworking hours” so long as the activity is “not in direct conflict with the essential
business-related interests of the employer”).
148
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402.5(1) (West 2018) (declaring it an “unfair
employment practice” for an employer to terminate employment because of “lawful
activity” that occurs off the employer’s premises and during nonworking hours
unless the restriction either “[r]elates to a bona fide occupational requirement or is
reasonably and rationally related to the employment activities and responsibilities
of a particular employee or a particular group of employees” or “[i]s necessary to
avoid a conflict of interest” or the appearance of such with the employer’s
responsibilities).
149
See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(B) (2012) (permitting
consumer reporting agencies to furnish consumer reports to those who “intend[] to
use the information for employment purposes”). The act imposes conditions on the
agencies for furnishing such reports, though. Id. § 1681b(b).
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employment decisions.150 Below, employer use of credit reports is
discussed first, followed by employer use of criminal record
information.
a.

Employer Use of Credit Reports

The tactful inattention paradigm appears in recent state
laws that limit employers from considering applicants’ credit
reports in making hiring decisions.
California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Nevada,
Oregon, Vermont, and Washington have all passed credit history
cloaking measures.151
In addition, Washington, D.C.
incorporated such a limitation into its human rights law.152
Credit history cloaking laws have some common features. In
general, the statutes apply to similar types of information—a
report that contains information about the applicant’s credit
history.153 The strictest laws prohibit employers from even
obtaining a report, implementing tactful inattention by requiring
the averting of eyes up front.154 Typically, they forbid employers
from acting on the contents of a credit report—that is,
discriminating on the basis of credit information.155 Connecticut
150

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.20.5 (West 2018); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5 (West
2018); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-126 (West 2018); COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 1103-4:1,
1103-4:12 (2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt (West 2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
19, § 711(g) (West 2018); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2(a)(8) (West 2017); 820 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/5, 70/30 (West 2018); MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 3-711
(West 2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.570 (West 2017); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 659A.320 (West 2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495i (West 2018); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 19.182.020(2)(c) (West 2018).
151
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.20.5; CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5; COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 8-2-126; COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 1103-4:1, 1103-4:12; CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 31-51tt; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711(g); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3782(a)(8); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/5, 70/30; MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 3711; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.570; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.320; VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 495i; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.182.020(2)(c).
152
D.C. Code Ann. § 2-14-2.11(a)(4)(D) (West 2018) (text applicable upon the
date of inclusion of its fiscal effect in an approved budget and financial plan).
153
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.20.5(a); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt(b); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/5; MD. CODE ANN. LAB.
& EMPL. § 3-711(b); VT. STAT. ANN. § 495i(a)(2), (3); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 19.182.010(4).
154
D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-14-2.11(a)(4)(D) (forbidding employers from, among
other acts, “us[ing] . . . an employee’s credit information”); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 659A.320(1); VT. STAT. ANN. § 495i(b)(2) (forbidding employers from
“[i]nquir[ing] about an applicant or employee’s credit report or credit history”);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.182.020(c).
155
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711(g)(1); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 378-2(a)(8); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/10(a); MD. CODE ANN. LAB. &
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has the weakest prohibition. It merely bars employers from
requiring an employee or applicant to consent to a request for a
credit report but does not prohibit an employer from making the
request, even though applicants might not feel free to deny it.156
It can perhaps be characterized as a suggestion that the
employer avert its eyes, putting more of a burden on the holder of
the key to the information—the employee or applicant who must
consent—to withhold the information’s accessibility by denying
consent.157
The tactful inattention paradigm is evident in different ways
in these laws. Essentially, the laws tell employers that even
though information about an applicant or employee is available,
nonetheless they must avert their eyes from it or, if they see it,
must avoid using it in making their human resources decisions.
Of course, these prohibitions have exceptions, some of which
threaten to swamp the rule.158 Still, these laws acknowledge
EMP. § 3-711(b), (c) (use for a non-prohibited purpose); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 659A.320(1); 21 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495i(b). Nevada comes close to
prohibiting the acquisition of a report, forbidding employers from inquiring
concerning a consumer credit report. NEV. REV. STAT. § 613(7)(3).
156
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt(b).
157
Id.
158
For instance, most of the laws exempt some types of management positions.
CAL LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a)(1); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt(a)(4)(A) (managerial
positions), (C) (fiduciary positions); MD. CODE ANN. LAB & EMPL. § 3-711(c)(2)(i);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.580(3)(c) (West 2017); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/10(b)(4)
(exempting those positions for which “a satisfactory credit history is an established
bona fide occupational requirement,” a feature that requires the presence of at least
one of seven designated circumstances, one of which is that the position is
managerial); VT. STAT. ANN. § 495i(c)(1)(E) (positions requiring “a financial fiduciary
responsibility to the employer or a client of the employer”); see also HAW. REV.
STAT. § 378-2.7(a)(1) (credit history is related to a bona fide occupational
requirement and the employee has received a conditional offer of employment),
id. § 378-2.7(a)(3) (the position is managerial or supervisory). Other positions
commonly exempted include those with financial institutions or that involve
monetary transactions. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(b) (institutions covered by
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809); id. § 1024.5(a)(5)(A)-(C)
(access to bank or credit card information along with an individual’s date of birth
and Social Security Number, excluding routine credit card transactions); id.
§ 1024.5(a)(8) (positions involving regular access to cash totaling $10,000 or more);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt(b) (financial institutions); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21402.11(d)(6) (West 2018) (duties of the position “involves access to personal
financial information”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2.7(a)(4); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 70/5 (excluding from the definition of “employer”), 70/10(b)(2), (3) (duties of the
position include access to cash or assets worth $2500 or more, or signatory power
over assets of $100 or more); MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 3-711(c)(2)(iii) (involves
a fiduciary responsibility, including collecting payments, and for those who are
provided an expense account or corporate debit or credit card); NEV. REV.
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that, with our information, an attitude of “finders-keepers”
toward sensitive information may not strike the sort of balance
that will allow individuals to fully flourish.159
b.

Employers’ Use of Criminal Record Information

The tactful inattention paradigm also appears in recent state
legislation restricting private employers from inquiring into or
considering the criminal record of job applicants. The practice is
common: a 2012 survey by the Society for Human Resource
Management reveals that 69% of employers investigate the
criminal background of every applicant.160 Such public record
information has become much more widely available. At one
time, a comprehensive criminal background check would have
required a county-by-county visit to clerk counters across the
country, but now, many records are available online so that an
individual’s record can be checked from a desk, or even a
smartphone.161
While it seems intuitively obvious why employers would
want to know of any criminal taint on an applicant’s past,
employee advocates worry that a criminal record—even a single
record of arrest—can unjustifiably isolate a candidate from
positions that do not necessarily require an unblemished
background.162 The numbers of those affected are not small: 8.6%
of American adults have a felony conviction, and approximately
65 million Americans have some kind of criminal record.163
Accordingly, advocacy groups such as the National Employment

STAT. § 613.570 (3)(a); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.320(2)(a) (federally insured
banks or credit unions); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495i(c)(1)(B), (C), (G); (access to
confidential financial information and the employer’s payroll, respectively).
159
See supra text accompanying notes 153–57 .
160
Society for Human Resource Management, SHRM Survey Findings:
Background Checking—The Use of Criminal Background Checks in Hiring
Decisions, SLIDESHARE (August 15, 2012), http://www.slideshare.net/shrm/2012backgroundcheck-criminalfinal (turn to page three on the slideshow).
161
FTC, FTC Warns Marketers That Mobile Apps May Violate Fair Credit
Reporting Act (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/02/mobileapps.shtm.
162
Am. Civil Liberties Union et al, State Reforms Reducing Consequences for
People with Criminal Records: 2011-2012 Legislative Round-Up, NAT’L EMP’T LAW
PROJECT 1 (Sept. 2012), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/StateColl
ateralConsequencesLegislativeRoundupSept2012.pdf.pdf.
163
Id.
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Law Project have urged states to reform their employment laws
to reduce the impact of a criminal background on an applicant’s
candidacy.164
Responding to such concerns, some state credit reporting
statutes restrict agencies from putting certain criminal record
information into consumer reports.165 These restrictions vary
widely. New York, with one of the more robust provisions, flatly
prohibits agencies from reporting criminal arrest information for
past charges unless the individual was convicted of the offense.166
Furthermore, the state prohibits the reporting of criminal
convictions more than seven years old unless an exception
applies.167 Similarly, California prohibits not only the reporting
of criminal record information that is more than seven years old,
but also the reporting of any pardoned convictions or other
arrests, indictments, or similar information where no conviction
Nonetheless, exclusions of criminal record
followed.168
information are often themselves subject to an exclusion,
returning such information to an employee’s credit report.169
However, even where criminal record information is
available on an applicant’s background checks or similar credit
report, some states limit what employers may ask about or
consider in terms of an applicant’s criminal record.170 This is a
tactful inattention approach because the information may be
available to an employer, but the employer must take efforts to
avoid looking at it or considering it. States with restrictions on
private employers include California,171 Hawaii,172 Illinois,173
164

Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 166–69.
166
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW. § 380-j(a)(1) (McKinney 2018). The statute does permit
a consumer reporting agency to disclose the detention of the consumer by a retail
mercantile establishment so long as he or she has executed an uncoerced admission
of wrongdoing, and received a prescribed notice from the establishment. Id. § 380j(b).
167
Id. § 380-j(f)(1)(v).
168
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.13(a)(6) (West 2018).
169
See supra text accompanying notes 165–68.
170
See infra notes 171–75.
171
CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7 (West 2018) (forbidding employers from asking an
applicant to disclose information regarding arrests or detentions that did not result
in conviction, and prohibiting employers from seeking such information, but
designating exceptions).
172
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2.5 (West 2017).
173
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 75/10, 75/15 (West 2018) (applying to private
employers with fifteen or more employees, and prohibiting them from inquiring into
or considering an applicant’s criminal history until the applicant has been deemed
165
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Massachusetts,174 Minnesota,175 New Jersey,176 and Rhode
Island.177
Hawaii’s statute, for example, provides that an
employer may “inquire about and consider an individual’s
criminal conviction record” only after the prospective employee
has received a conditional offer of employment, and only where
“the conviction record bears a rational relationship to the duties
and responsibilities of the position.”178 Some states have enacted
provisions restricting criminal history inquiries for positions in
public agencies, as opposed to those with private employers.179
Here, too, the tactful inattention paradigm appears.
Criminal records are, after all, public records, available in many
states online, and even on smartphone apps that are available to

qualified and either has been notified of an interview or has received a conditional
offer of employment).
174
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(9 ½) (West 2018) (prohibiting
employers from requesting criminal record information on initial application forms,
though with certain exceptions).
175
MINN. ST. ANN. § 364.021 (West 2018) (prohibiting private employers from
inquiring into or considering an applicant’s criminal record history, also with certain
specific exceptions).
176
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:6B-11–34:6B-14 (West 2018) (prohibiting employers
with fifteen or more employees, and prohibiting employers from asking about an
applicant’s criminal record “during the initial employment application process”).
177
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-7 (West 2017).
178
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2.5 (West 2017). As an example of a weaker
protection, Rhode Island merely prohibits employers from including questions as to
an applicant’s criminal record on employment applications, while permitting
employers to ask applicants about criminal convictions (though apparently not about
arrests or charges not resulting in convictions) at the first interview or later. R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-7.
179
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-5-101 (West 2018) (limiting the
consideration of a criminal record in applicants for public employment); CONN. GEN
STAT. ANN. § 46a-80 (West 2018) (providing that an applicant will not be disqualified
from employment by the state “solely because of a prior conviction of a crime,” with
exceptions); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711(g)(1) (West 2018) (prohibiting public
employers from inquiring into or considering the criminal record or history, along
with credit history or credit score, during the initial application process, with
exceptions); MD. CODE ANN. STATE PERS. & PENS. § 2-203 (West 2018) (effective July
1, 2018, and prohibiting public employers (with exceptions) from inquiring into an
applicant’s criminal history until after the applicant has been provided an
opportunity to interview); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-202 (West 2018) (prohibiting
public employers from asking for an applicant’s criminal history “until the public
employer has determined the applicant meets the minimum employment
qualifications,” providing exceptions); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-2-3 (West 2018)
(prohibiting public employers from considering misdemeanor convictions not
involving moral turpitude and arrest records not followed by conviction, and further
prohibiting such employers from inquiring about criminal convictions on initial
applications and from considering them before the applicant has been selected as a
finalist).
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all.180 Similarly, the FCRA permits employers, among others, to
access employees’ credit reports and expressly acknowledges that
employment purposes are justifiable reasons to access a credit
report.181 Such state limits on access express the belief that
simply because data exists and one has the means to grab it, does
not mean one should grab it—no peeping permitted.
Even when a statute eventually permits a peek at a criminal
record, such as Hawaii’s provision,182 the statute requires tactful
inattention until the employer has a concrete reason to “attend”
to this aspect of an employee or candidate’s past.
III. EMERGING AREAS OF TACTFUL INATTENTION IN LAW
The tactful inattention paradigm offers a possible path for
protecting privacy in the big data age. Instead of requiring
individuals to make Herculean efforts to avoid dribbling data, we
instead can require observers to make modest efforts to avoid
peeping at or using, it.183 We can, in effect, require the use of
virtual blinkers, and, as discussed above, have done so both
traditionally and recently.
A.

Employers’ Examination of Social Media

One area of conflict that could benefit from a tactful
inattention paradigm is the use by employers of the information
employees and applicants put on social media such as Facebook
and Twitter. Requiring employers to limit their gaze on and
their use of such information would allow individuals to fully
benefit from these new technologies and the relationships that
they underlie and promote, without having to hide the
information from those who might use it to harm them.184

180
See, e.g., In re Filiquarian Publ’g, LLC, No. C-4401 (Apr. 30, 2013) (decision
and order), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/05/130501filq
uariando.pdf.
181
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(B) (2012).
182
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2.5(a)-(b) (West 2018).
183
Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy as Trust: Sharing Personal Information in a
Networked World, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 559, 599–600 (2015).
184
Josh Eidelson, Can You Be Fired for What You Post on Facebook?, SLATE
(July 3, 2012, 4:40 PM), http://slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence
/2012/07/getting_fired_for_what_you_post_on_facebook.html. Labor law has already
intervened to regulate the use by employers of employees’ Facebook
communications; the NLRB found firings for Facebook use by employees discussing
complaints about their jobs. Design Tech. Grp., LLC, No. 20-CA-035511 (2017), 2017
WL 4925473 (N.L.R.B.), at *1.
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Employers might want to view an employee’s social media
activities for several reasons. Employers may want to be sure
that an employee is not disparaging the workplace, may want to
monitor communications in order to comply with a statute or
regulation,185 or may want to exploit employees’ social media
accounts to advertise a business’s products and service.186
Nonetheless, a great deal of potential postings from individuals
will fall well outside any of those legitimate areas of concern, and
requiring tactful inattention to media activities in which the
employer does not have a sufficient and legitimate interest
protects the employee’s privacy while still addressing an
employer’s legitimate concerns.
Currently, several states expressly prohibit employers from
requiring applicants to provide personal passwords to
employers.187 In addition, a few states prohibit an employer from
compelling an employee to access a personal online account in
the employer’s presence, that is, “shoulder surfing.”188 These
185

See, e.g., Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Social Media Web Sites: Guidance on
Blogs and Social Networking Web Sites, REG. NOTICE (Jan. 2010),
http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/p120779.pdf.
186
See Joseph J. Lazzarotti, Workplace Privacy, Data Management & Security
Report: States Continue To Protect the Personal Social Media Accounts of Employees,
with Oregon Likely to Add an Interesting Twist (May 28, 2015),
http://www.workplaceprivacyreport.com/2015/05/articles/workplace-privacy/statescontinue-to-protect-the-personal-social-media-accounts-of-employees-with-oregonlikely-to-add-an-interesting-twist/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&
utm_campaign=Feed%3A+WorkplacePrivacyDataManagementSecurityReport+%28
Workplace+Privacy%2C+Data+Management+%26+Security+Report%29.
187
ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-2-124 (West 2018); CAL. LAB. CODE § 980 (West 2018);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-127 (West 2018) (password prohibition limited to access
through the employee’s or applicant’s “personal electronic communication device”);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-40X (West 2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 709A (West
2018); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/10 (West 2018); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1951–1955
(West 2018); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 616–619 (2017); MD. CODE ANN. LAB. &
EMPL. § 3-712 (West 2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.278 (West 2018); NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-3503 (West 2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.135 (West
2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:74(II) (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:6B-5–10
(West 2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-34 (West 2018); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
40, §§ 173.2, 173.3 (West 2018); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.330 (West 2018); 28 R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-56-1-6 (West 2017); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-1-1001–1004
(West 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-48-101–301 (West 2018); VIR. CODE
ANN. § 40.1-28.7:5(B) (West 2018); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.44.200, 205 (West
2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.55 (West 2017).
188
See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.330(1)(c) (2015); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 50-1-1003(a)(3) (2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.200(1)(b) (West 2013);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.55(2)(a)(1); see also Susan Park, Employee Internet Privacy: A
Proposed Act That Balances Legitimate Employer Rights and Employee Privacy, 51
AM. BUS. L.J. 779, 790 (2014).
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model tactful inattention by prohibiting employers from
demanding “key” information that they know would provide them
access to personal information about the employee.
In addition to prohibiting employers from asking an
employee or applicant for a social media password, many of the
statutes provide that employers who inadvertently receive an
employee’s login information may not use it to log into the
employee’s account.189 This is an example of a statute requiring
tactful inattention to information within one’s reach.
Such laws reflect that given modern social media,
information that individuals may have once shared over a phone
or in a face-to-face conversation, hidden from the employer’s
gaze, may now appear on social media, where an employer may
be able to access it, at least with the employee’s credentials. But
these laws help stem the pullback on privacy of these advances in
communication, imposing on employers a duty to avoid peeping.
The information may be available in the cybersphere, but that
does not mean that employers have a right to access it, and if
they do get their hands on the “key” to it, they may not exploit
that power to access.
B. Use of Consumers’ Online Information by Political
Campaigns and Vendors
While employers may want to surveil their employees to
keep them in check, political campaigns and vendors may want
to obtain individuals’ data to manipulate their votes and their
purchases. The power and availability of such data calls for
tactful inattention.
In 2015, Dr. Aleksandr Kogan, a professor at Cambridge
University, sought data from Facebook for an app he created
called “mydigitallife,” which purported to be a personality
assessment for use by psychologists.190 Facebook claimed that

189

See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-2-124(b)(3); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
55/10(b)(4); LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:1953(C); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-3510; N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 275:74(V); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 173.2(C); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 659A.330(6); VIR. CODE ANN. §§ 40.1-28.5(C), 28.7(C) (West 2018); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.200(4); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-5H-1(c) (West 2018); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 995.55(7)(d).
190
Nicole Banas, Facebook Execs Liable for “Massive” Data Scandal, Investor
Suit Says, WESTLAW SECS. ENFORCEMENT & LITIG. DAILY BRIEFING, 2018 WL
1473644 (Mar. 27, 2018).
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Dr. Kogan said he wanted the data for academic purposes.191 But
Dr. Kogan had been hired by Cambridge Analytica, a political
consulting firm, the month the company was founded by Stephen
Bannon192 with Robert Mercer, a Republican party donor.193 Mr.
Bannon later became chief White House strategist to President
Trump.194 Dr. Kogan’s app provided Cambridge Analytica access
to 87 million Facebook users’ data,195 which it used to influence
voters to support Trump’s candidacy.196 Under the secrecy
paradigm, a data broker may use the data without restriction. In
contrast, a tactful inattention approach might require those that
possess social media users’ search, “like,” and posting
information to refrain from using it in such ways.
Such an approach appears in a Congressional bill drafted in
response to the Cambridge Analytica scandal by Senators
Markey and Blumenthal.197 Somewhat cumbersomely entitled
the “Customer Online Notification for Stopping Edge-provider
Network Transgressions Act” (the “CONSENT Act”), the bill
would require data sellers, called “edge providers” in the bill,198

191

Matthew Rosenberg et al., How Trump Consultants Exploited the Facebook
Data of Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-campaign.html.
192
Matthew Rosenberg, Professor Apologizes for Helping Cambridge Analytica
Harvest Facebook Data, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/04/22/business/media/cambridge-analytica-aleksandr-kogan.html.
193
William Booth & Karla Adam, Cambridge Analytica’s Alexander Nix: Bong
Villain, Tech Genius, or Hustler?, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/cambridge-analyticas-alexander-nixbond-villain-tech-genius-or-hustler/2018/03/27/14c99112-2e34-11e8-8dc93b51e028b845_story.html?utm_term=.c672d64a3831.
194
Jose A. DelReal, Trump Draws Sharp Rebuke, Concerns over Newly
Appointed Chief White House Strategist Stephen Bannon, WASH. POST (Nov. 13,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/11/13/trumpdraws-sharp-rebuke-concerns-over-newly-appointed-chief-white-housestrategist/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9e145906f9a9.
195
Sarah Emerson, Mark Zuckerberg: “It Was My Mistake” Facebook
Compromised Data of 87 Million Users, MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 4, 2018, 5:44 PM),
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/7xdw99/mark-zuckerberg-it-was-mymistake-facebook-compromised-data-of-87-million-users.
196
Rosenberg et al., supra note 191. The company created profiles based on
individual features such as age, gender, ethnicity, race, income, advertising
resonance, consumer and lifestyle data, and political engagement. Mark Andrus, The
New Oil: The Right To Control One’s Identity in Light of the Commoditization of the
Individual, A.B.A. BUS. L. TODAY (Sept. 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/business_law/publications/blt/2017/09/06_andrus.html.
197
S. 2639, 115th Cong. (2017–2018).
198
The bill defines “edge provider[s]” as those providing an “edge service,” which
is one provided over the Internet that meets any of four criteria, including one
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to, among other requirements, “obtain opt-in consent from a
customer to use, share, or sell the sensitive customer propriety
information.”199 Furthermore, the bill would restrict a preferred
dodge around such privacy provisions, whereby service providers
simply deny the service to non-compliant customers; the bill
would prohibit an edge provider from imposing “take-it-or-leaveit” conditions on the customer.200 Thus, services like Facebook
would have to gain customers’ explicit permission to sell their
information to third parties such as Dr. Kogan—a tactful
inattention to the content of such information and its commercial
value.
While the federal response is at present merely a bill, the
state of California responded to the Cambridge Analytica scandal
with an emphatic and powerful privacy law, the California
Consumer Privacy Act of 2018.201 Under it, certain businesses202
must, upon request provide information about their general
collection practices to consumers, including information about
the categories and specific pieces of personal information203 the
business has collected.204 Furthermore, consumers have the right
to request businesses to delete any collected personal
information.205 Those businesses that sell consumers’ personal
information or disclose it for business purposes also must, upon
request, disclose to the consumer what they collected and sold
“through which a customer divulges sensitive customer proprietary information.” Id.
§ 2(a)(4), (5).
199
The bill does not impose this requirement directly on edge providers; rather,
the bill calls for the Federal Trade Commission to promulgate regulations that
impose such a requirement. Id. § 2(b)(2)(A), (B)(iii).
200
Id. § 2(b)(2)(A), (B)(vi).
201
California Privacy Act of 2018, ch. 55, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West), as
amended by 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 735 (to be codified CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 1798.100–198) (adding title 1.81.5 to part 4 of division 3 of the Civil Code).
The Act becomes effective January 1, 2020. Id. § 3 (to be codified at CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1798.198(a)). The Act refers explicitly to the Cambridge Analytica
revelations. Id. § 2(g).
202
The Act defines “business[es]” to mean designated organizations “operated
for profit or financial benefit . . . that collect[] consumers’ personal information” and
that meet one of three specified thresholds. Id. § 3 (to be codified at CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1798.140(c)).
203
This term is defined quite broadly to include identifiers, biometric
information, and “Internet or other electronic activity information,” among other
items. Id. (to be codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)). However, the term
excludes “publicly available information.” Id. (to be codified at CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1798.140(o)(2)).
204
Id. (to be codified at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100, 1798.110).
205
Id. (to be codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(a)).
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about that consumer.206 As a key matter, consumers can opt-out
of the sale by a business of their personal information,207 and
businesses may not discriminate against consumers who exercise
their rights, although a business may charge different prices or
provide different levels of quality if the “difference is reasonably
related to the value provided to the consumer by the consumer’s
data,” a potentially enormous loophole.208
Nonetheless,
California’s Consumer Privacy Act represents a potent tactful
inattention approach to maintaining the privacy of individual’s
digital data.
While political campaigns may seek a consumer’s individual
information to amass power, vendors and advertisers seek it to
create a picture of a consumer’s personality to market goods and
services, tailor responses,209 and even create “boutique” pricing,
individually targeted to leverage the most money out of any given
consumer.210 Relatedly, the burgeoning field of “neuromarketing”
seeks to study brain activity in response to stimuli to understand
consumer preferences.211
Advertisers increasingly make
secondary use of information that they think gives cues as to an
individual’s personality to shape advertising and target that
individual in a manner that the advertisers think will be
specifically appealing.212 Such personality profiling may not
always necessarily hurt a given consumer, but laws in the mode
of tactful inattention could help skew such uses to the consumer’s
benefit and away from the consumer’s detriment.

206

Id. (to be codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.115(a)).
Id. (to be codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120(a)).
208
Id. (to be codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.125(a)(1), (2)). The bill specifically
lists the denial of goods or services, the charging of different prices, and the
providing of different levels of goods or services among the prohibited acts of
discrimination. Id. (to be codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.125(a)(A)–(C)). However,
businesses may offer financial incentives. Id. (to be codified at CAL. CIV. CODE §
1798.125(b)).
209
See infra text accompanying notes 213–14.
210
See infra text accompanying note 216.
211
See Sandra Blakeslee, If Your Brain Has a “Buy Button,” What Pushes It?,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2004), https://nytimes.com/2004/10/19/science/if-your-brain-hasa-buybutton-what-pushes-it.html; G. A. Calvert & M. J. Brammer, Predicting
Consumer Behavior: Using Novel Mind-Reading Approaches, PubMed ID 22678839
(describing advances in medical learning to help improve “greater accuracy of
prediction in terms of consumer acceptance of new brands, products, and
campaigns”).
212
See, e.g., Joanna Penn, Behavioral Advertising: The Cryptic Hunter and
Gatherer of the Internet, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 599, 601 (2012).
207
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For instance, an advertiser could use consumer-specific
purchasing patterns to target a particular consumer and
manipulate him or her into behavior more favorable to a
particular merchant. A scenario sketched by Professor Tal Z.
Zarsky illustrates the kind of manipulation that a savvy seller
could engage in, one who notices that a consumer has stopped
buying cigarettes and has bought a nicotine patch.213 Deducing
that the consumer seeks to cease smoking, the merchant could
target him with cigarette ads and even free cigarettes.214
Vendors could also use such data to analyze consumer
behavior in the marketplace, tailoring their own behavior
towards a particular consumer. For instance, radio frequency
identification tags could help identify “undesirable customers”
who “monopolize the attention of attendants” before leaving
without buying.215 What are some other practical uses of these
indicators of personality traits that our purchasing, surfing, and
postings may give away? As Professor Lior Jacob Strahilevitz
discusses, merchants and service providers could use consumer
data to discriminate among customers on the basis of their
wealth in providing them services, so information privacy could
benefit poor consumers by “thwarting” such sorting.216
One lucrative use of information about personal preferences
is to engage in “weblining”—charging higher prices to certain
consumers based on the preferences revealed by their online
activity.217 According to one study, such practices, known by
economists as “first-degree price discrimination,” but commonly
213

Tal Z. Zarsky, “Mine Your Own Business!”: Making the Case for the
Implications of the Data Mining of Personal Information in the Forum of Public
Opinion, 5 YALE J.L. & TECH. 4, 20 (2002–2003).
214
Id.
215
Jonathon Zittrain, Privacy 2.0, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 65, 72 (2008).
216
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 2010, 2029 (2013) (“Protecting privacy seems to thwart price and service
discrimination while fostering statistical discrimination on the basis of race and
gender and lowering production costs.”). He speculates on the implications for the
use of big data and the political process, given that it appears that introverts are less
likely to participate in the process. Id. at 2025.
217
See, e.g., Dennis D. Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online Privacy:
Regulation, Self-Regulation, or Co-Regulation?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 439, 450–51
(2011); Zittrain, supra note 215, at 72 (describing how information about individual
behavior can help enable price discrimination). Some have defended the ability of
firms to engage in this kind of price discrimination as possibly benefiting consumers
and the market alike. See Matthew A. Edwards, Price and Prejudice: The Case
Against Consumer Equality in the Information Age, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559,
559 (2006).
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as “dynamic pricing,” are increasing.218
By using detailed
personal profiles of shoppers pulled from tracked data, retailers
can “apply sophisticated pricing models to individual consumer
profiles through automated price-setting systems in order to
target personalized prices to individual consumers.”219
Pricing discrimination is not a new concept. Some states
prohibit price discrimination under certain circumstances,
usually in the context of a competitor’s discrimination intended
to hinder competition.220 In addition, § 2(a) of the federal
Robinson-Patman Act prohibits certain kinds of price
discrimination, but without any right to a private cause of
action.221 But the Robinson-Patman Act has not been used to
218
JOSEPH TUROW ET AL., OPEN TO EXPLOITATION: AMERICAN SHOPPERS
ONLINE AND OFFLINE 10 (Annenberg Pub. Pol’y Ctr. of Univ. of Pa. ed., 2005),
http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/Turow_APPC_Repo
rt_WEB_FINAL2.pdf.
219
Akiva A. Miller, What Do We Worry About When We Worry About Price
Discrimination? The Law and Ethics of Using Personal Information for Pricing, 19 J.
TECH. L. & POL’Y 41, 49–50 (2014). The author notes that data brokers offer a
variety of options to retailers to reach not just their own prior shoppers, but
shoppers of competitors as well. Id. at 52.
220
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3 6-2-103(1) (West 2018); Dunlap v. Colo.
Springs Cablevision, Inc., 829 P.2d 1286, 1296 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) (plaintiffs,
consumers, could sue to enforce state anti-price discrimination provision even
though scope is limited “to conduct intended to destroy or prevent primary-line
competition”). But see Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 38 Cal. 3d 913, 930 (1985)
(affirming demurrer of deceptive trade practices act claim based on bank’s
“ ‘arbitrary’ price discrimination” of waiving NSF charges for some customers but
not others, reasoning that such a waiver did not “describe[] acts of unfair
competition”).
221
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2012). The provision states as
follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price
between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality,
where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in
commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale
within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of
Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of
the United States, and where the effect of such discrimination may be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person
who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination,
or with customers of either of them.
Id. See also Douglas M. Kochelek, Note, Data Mining and Antitrust, 22 HARV. J. L. &
TECH. 515, 523–24 (2009) (also discussing the Sherman Act’s applicability to price
discrimination).
The Federal Trade Commission has sued sellers who have sold products to
different customers at “discriminatory” prices, although these cases also seem to be
directed to actions intended to hamper competition, as opposed to maximize profits.
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prohibit modern “weblining” or “boutique pricing” at the
consumer level or in the context of the new data that can
powerfully target individuals. As an example, Zarsky writes
about the hypothetical situation of a wealthy philosophy student
whose book buying behavior leads an online retailer to charge
him more, generally, and even more during the times the seller
has determined the student is most likely to want books.222
This sort of use of consumer-specific information can provoke
outrage—even in Internet-savvy consumers. Professor William
W. Fisher writes that consumers often respond strongly and
negatively to such practices.223
Fisher cites Amazon.com’s
experiment with “dynamic pricing,” whereby it was believed that
Amazon quoted higher prices to existing Amazon customers than
to new ones.224 In part, Fisher writes, the anger arose from the
surreptitious use of the practice believed to have taken place.225
Another study of consumer reactions to “dynamic pricing” found
that between 87%–91% of the consumers surveyed disagreed
with statements along the lines of “It [i]s OK if [a supermarket or
online store] charges different people different prices for the
same products during the same hour.”226
Aside from the unfairness perception that Professor Fisher
discusses, Professor Zarsky identifies a particular concern about
such surreptitious use of data to profile consumers, whether to
create a personal price or to market a particular product: it can
be inaccurate, leading to unjust treatment of a consumer.227 In
See, e.g., FTC v. Hunt Foods & Indus., Inc., 178 F. Supp. 448, 454 (S.D. Cal. 1959),
aff’d, 286 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1960). Furthermore, some case law approves of price
changing so long as the seller charges all competing customers the same amount at
any given time, indicating that contemporaneous price discrimination would be
unlawful. See, e.g., K-S Pharm., Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 962 F.2d 728, 733
(7th Cir. 1992); A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396,
1406-08 (7th Cir. 1989); Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co. v. J.R. Simplot Co., 418 F.2d 793, 806
(9th Cir. 1969); Xi v. Apple, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 464, 468 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). The
Illinois Supreme Court concluded that an insurance company’s failure to disclose to
home buyers that it had paid rebates to institutions that had bought the insurance
on the home buyers’ behalf, thus reducing the actual cost of the insurance but
without benefitting the buyers, could be an actionable deceptive trade practice under
state law. Fitzgerald v. Chi. Title & Trust Co., 380 N.E.2d 790, 794–95 (Ill. 1978).
222
Zarsky, supra note 213, at 19.
223
William W. Fisher, III, When Should We Permit Differential Pricing of
Information?, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1, 10 (2007) (describing the perception of consumers
to such practices as “gouging”).
224
Id. at 11–12.
225
Id. at 12.
226
TUROW ET AL., supra note 218, at 22.
227
Zarsky, supra note 213, at 47–50.
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his hypothetical, a consumer could be charged a higher insurance
premium simply because a consumer was erroneously classified
as high-risk.228 In another hypothetical, an insurer wrongly
classifies an insured as someone who enjoys high risk sports,
inferred from her reading and web browsing activity, and
accordingly raises her insurance premium, even though in fact
the consumer leads a conservative life and has made her choices
for an article she’s writing, not to enhance her own leisure
activities.229 Such surreptitious labeling can be completely
invisible to us, and as impossible to fix as it is to detect.
From a tactful inattention standpoint, legislators could
regulate the use of individual data for personality profiling,
whether used for marketing, service tailoring, or price targeting.
Thus, the mere fact that troves of individually identifiable
consumer data were available, were no longer “secret,” would not
mean that the data was fair game for simply any use a data
miner could dream up. Rather, legislators could accede to the
wishes of individuals about how they want their data used,
changing the balance of power between merchants and their
targets.
IV. BENEFITS OF THE TACTFUL INATTENTION PARADIGM IN LAW
Laws adopting a tactful inattention paradigm shift the
balance of power and thereby change the intensity of scrutiny: if
we move the burden of protecting information toward those who
want to exploit others’ data, they might put less energy into
inquisitiveness, into voyeurism. If we reduce or eliminate the
profit to which disinterred information can be devoted, then

228

Id. at 49.
Id. at 21. Zarsky examines the likely consequences of price discrimination
techniques like this one, along with the likelihood of prohibited profiling techniques
that the practice of “Weblining” can produce. Id. at 25–26, 47–50. He notes as well
the information imbalance that arises to the consumer’s detriment when the seller
has a lot of information about the customer’s “demand curve” and “reserve price,”
and the consumer’s ignorance of corresponding information on the other side. Id. at
30–31. “The practical consequences of this phenomenon are poor and misinformed
people paying higher prices for products due to ignorance of information market
dynamics.” Id. at 31. See also Nathan Newman, The Costs of Lost Privacy: Consumer
Harm and Rising Economic Inequality in the Age of Google, 40 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 849, 852–53 (2014) (discussing possible consequences of Google’s mechanism
that allows advertisers to target specific users, such as payday lenders and subprime
mortgage lenders, to find financially imperiled consumers). Concerned with “online
behavioral targeting” on the basis of race, Professor Newman argues for “a detailed
and explicit ‘opt-in’ consent” for Google to collect certain data. Id. at 886.
229
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others will be less motivated to unearth the personal and
sensitive information to begin with. By moving away from the
secrecy paradigm towards the tactful inattention paradigm, we
can help promote advantageous uses of personally identifiable
information such as those for medical research.230 For example,
large aggregate patient databases are being mined for research
due to their rich nature. 231 The secrecy paradigm may rely on
the anonymization of data—treating as “secret” information that
has supposedly been peeled of individual markers—
“deidentified,” in HIPAA’s parlance232—but modern technology
continues to defeat anonymizing techniques.233 Alternatively,
forced anonymization of data can strip the usefulness of data for
researchers.234 By recognizing that such data may be personally
identifiable—that is, it may have lost its secrecy—but forbidding
certain uses of it, we can preserve the usefulness of the data to
medical research while still preventing its original sources from
being unduly harmed by its “visibility.”
By prohibiting specific uses of information, a tactful
inattention-focused law can guard against a harm Professor
Solove identifies: “[t]he risk of disclosure [that] can prevent
people from engaging in activities that further their own selfdevelopment.”235 The tactful inattention paradigm can also
address the law’s tendency to permit disclosure that would
otherwise be prohibited but for the fact that others know of it.236
This is not to argue that the secrecy paradigm is useless and
should be replaced wholesale.
Tactful inattention cannot
satisfactorily resolve all injuries to privacy. Some injuries result
from the sheer and simple exposure of certain information itself.
230

See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a
New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1866–
68 (2011) (describing the benefits of data for medical research).
231
Marc A. Rodwin, Patient Data: Property, Privacy & the Public Interest, 36
AM. J. L. & MED. 586, 595–97 (2010).
232
45 C.F.R. § 164.514(a). See also supra text accompanying notes 87–93.
233
See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising
Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1705 (2010) (describing the
problems of “reidentification” of data).
234
Id. at 1714. With respect to the anonymizing of health data, technology has
been developing the reconstruction of facial and cranial features from brain images
that might make reidentification of those images a possibility. See Judy Illes & Sofia
Lombera, Identifiable Neuro Ethics Challenges to the Banking of Neuro Data, 10
MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 71, 79 (2009).
235
See Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 119, at 529–30.
236
Id. at 531 (“The law often protects against disclosure when the information is
kept secret but not when others know about it.”).
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Professor Solove specifically identifies “deeply primordial”
information that “is not revealing of anything we typically use to
judge people’s character.”237 The secrecy paradigm, enforced
through social conventions, remains necessary for this type of
information.
Rather, it is to urge the consideration of a different,
potentially supplementary approach in certain contexts. Neither
paradigm serves well in all instances. Professor Jerry Kang, in
writing about information privacy in cyberspace and
surveillance,238 discusses the problem of general laws governing
the flow of all personal information that would “constrain too
often even casual observation.”239
He was writing of the
difference between regulating the flow of personal information in
real space as opposed to cyberspace,240 but the same issues can
arise in cyberspace with digital information.
Furthermore, while technology has heightened the
availability of personal data, it may also help implement the
tactful inattention paradigm. For instance, Professor Paul Ohm
has compared attempts to keep personally identifiable
information from being reidentified to the game of “whack-amole.”241 However, by working with technology to identify
tracking and auditing functions to control the use, rather than
the observation, of data, we can work with developing technology
instead of against it, and we can monitor and identify uses of
personal data. Professor Ohm argues that computer security
research can lead to techniques to monitor access controls and
audit trails, permitting users to interact with the data only in
predetermined, limited ways, and recording users’ use of data.242
In this way, laws modeled on the tactful inattention paradigm
can be enforced, calling out users’ uses, rather than targets’ slips.
In summary, the tactful inattention paradigm offers an
alternative, or perhaps supplementary approach, to protecting
privacy that can be an effective option in some circumstances,
while not serving the best balance of interests in others.
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Id. at 533.
See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1193 (1988).
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Id. at 1268.
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Id.
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Ohm, supra note 233, at 1742.
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CONCLUSION
The secrecy paradigm may have served the analog age
profitably well, but sensitive data is simply too accessible for that
paradigm to continue as the model for all privacy laws. The
nature of information and people’s relationship to it has changed,
but people continue to need privacy to flourish as individuals and
in our relationships.
Erving Goffman’s tactful inattention concept can serve as the
basis of a new paradigm, one that requires us to avert our eyes
from data when using it would unjustifiably impair someone’s
privacy. Aspects of American law have long used such a
paradigm, such as in evidence law and Peeping Tom statutes.
Recently, legislatures have been turning to a tactful inattention
model for legislation addressing some of our modern information
capabilities, such as in the GINA and the FCRA. Two areas ripe
for continued implementation of the paradigm are employment
law and the use by employers of their employees’ social media
information, and the use by political campaigns and vendors of
the data consumers cannot help but leave behind in their forays
on the Internet. A tactful inattention paradigm, by recognizing
that digital data has become widely accessible, can redistribute
the responsibility for preventing sensitive information’s misuse
and thereby reinvigorate privacy law to promote human
flourishing.

